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Abstract 
  This paper estimates the effects of privatization on worker separations and wages 
using retrospective data from a national probability sample of Ukrainian households.   
Detailed worker characteristics are used to control for compositional differences and to 
assess types of observable “winners” and “losers” from privatization.  Preprivatization 
worker-firm matches are used to control for unobservables in worker and firm selection.  
The results imply that privatization reduces wages by 5 percent and cuts the layoff 
probability in half.  Outside investor ownership reduces separations but leaves wages 
unaffected.  Winners from privatization tend to be higher-skilled employees of larger 
firms, but there is no discernable relationship with gender, education, or experience. 
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(National Council for East European and Eurasian Research) and EROC (Economic 
Research and Outreach Center at the Kyiv-Mohyla School of Economics) for financial 
support.  All errors are our own.   1
1.  Introduction 
  The principal argument for privatization around the world is that profit orientation 
will raise firm efficiency and competitiveness.  However, does any increase in efficiency 
come at the expense of workers?  Although privatization has frequently been opposed by 
workers expecting layoffs and wage cuts, economic reasoning does not imply such 
effects unambiguously.  To be sure, cost-efficiencies may be achieved by reducing excess 
employment and worker rents (e.g., Boycko et al., 1996).  But they may also be achieved 
through savings in other areas, and they may lead to an expansion of production that 
increases the need for well-compensated labor.  The increase in labor demand after 
privatization could be still larger if the new private owners act entrepreneurially to extend 
their markets (e.g., Frydman et al., 1999).  Both the need to attract new workers and the 
enhanced use of incentive pay under private ownership could increase wages.  These 
mechanisms work to offset the negative effects that workers expect, and they may even 
result in expanded employment and higher wages. 
Moreover, the effects of privatization on workers may vary with the type of new 
private owners, particularly if these include managers or the workers themselves.  Indeed, 
although workers in transition economies were not always successful in stopping 
privatization, they favored privatization methods leading to majority insider ownership, 
so they could control the amount of labor restructuring and/or share in any gains (e.g., 
Earle and Estrin, 1996).  According to Aghion and Blanchard’s (1998) model of insider 
privatization, restructuring only takes place with outsider control, and the restructuring 
hurts workers.  However, although a slow restructuring strategy could benefit workers in 
the short run, it may result in reduced competitiveness and force layoffs and/or wage cuts   2
in the longer run.  In contrast, a more vigorous restructuring program could allow the 
firm to expand its scale, raising employment and wages. 
  The effects of privatization could also be heterogeneous for different types of 
workers, creating winners and losers within firms.  For example, new private owners 
could engage in skill-biased restructuring, benefiting workers with higher skills 
associated with education, occupation, or computer training.  Older and longer tenured 
workers may be losers if they are less flexible or if their productivity has fallen 
disproportionately more than other types of workers.  Previous research has shown that 
inequality has risen during transition and that differentials associated with schooling, 
gender, and firm size have changed, but there has been little attention to the role played 
by privatization.
1 
The average effects of privatization on workers and the effects of different types 
of privatization on different types of workers are therefore empirical questions.   
However, while a large number of studies have estimated the effect of privatization on 
firm efficiency, few have investigated the effects on workers, and the limitations of the 
existing research are profound.
2  Sample sizes are often very small.  The seminal paper in 
the literature, Haskel and Szymanski (1993), analyzes 14 British public companies, of 
which just four are privatized, while Kikeri (1998) describes case studies of privatization 
effects on labor in several developing countries.  Moreover, few papers control fully for 
selection problems.  One selection issue is the potential for systematic differences in 
                                                 
1 On inequality, see Milanovic (1999).  For gender differentials see Brainerd (2000), and for schooling and firm size see 
Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova Peter (2005), both on Ukraine.  Two studies examine the role of privatization in wage 
inequality:  Fleisher et al. (2005) carry out a meta-analysis of studies across countries, finding that increases in 
schooling premia are positively associated with large-scale privatization, but Münich et al.’s (2005) study of Czech 
workers finds that the premium increased prior to privatization. 
2 On firm performance effects of privatization in transition economies, see Djankov and Murrell (2002) for an overview 
of the literature and Brown et al. (2006) for evidence on Ukraine.   3
firms chosen for privatization versus those remaining state-owned.  Nearly all studies of 
the private-public wage gap use cross-section analysis that does not account for this 
selection.
3  Most studies that do follow firms before and after privatization have very 
short time series, such as La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes’ (1999) study of 170 privatized 
firms in Mexico with information on only one year after privatization.  Jones and Simon 
(2005) estimate wage regressions with two-year panels at the very start of privatization in 
Bulgaria.  Only two studies, Lizal and Svejnar (2002) and Brown et al. (2005), use large 
samples of firms before and after privatization, include state firms as a control group, and 
employ firm fixed effects; thus they are able to handle selection through regression-
adjusted difference-in-differences. 
However, even the firm-level studies that analyze large panels such as these suffer 
from a number of other limitations.  Firm-level studies of the effects of privatization on 
workers capture changes in only net employment and average wages.
4  They are unable 
to observe individual worker characteristics and behavior, so they cannot measure worker 
turnover or changes in the composition of employment.  Nor can they estimate the effects 
of privatization on different types of workers, defined with respect to characteristics such 
as skills, age, tenure, gender, and occupation.  Moreover, a second type of potential 
selection bias may arise if workers choose employment in privatized or state firms and if 
this self-selection is related to their pay (e.g., because more productive workers prefer to 
work in privatized firms).  Firm-level studies cannot control for this worker self-selection 
process.  Finally, the measure of private ownership in any of these studies is seldom 
                                                 
3 Such studies in former Soviet economies include Brainerd (2002) for Russia and Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova 
Peter (2005) for Russia and Ukraine.  Worker-level studies frequently face measurement problems both concerning 
ownership (as new private and old privatized companies may not be distinguished) and wages (due to the volatility 
associated with wage arrears). 
4 Firm-level data sets rarely contain information on hiring and separations.  The only previous paper  examining the 
impact of privatization on turnover is Brown and Earle’s (2003) study of a Russian firm survey.   4
disaggregated more than between domestic and foreign ownership; measurement 
constraints prevent attention to the heterogeneity of domestic ownership in many 
transition economies, in particular the presence of large-scale insider ownership. 
  This study estimates the wage and layoff effects of privatization using data that 
greatly mitigate these problems.  We analyze the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring 
Survey (ULMS), a database drawn from a nationally representative probability sample of 
about 4,000 Ukrainian households containing more than 8,000 individual adult 
respondents.  The survey was carried out in 2003, and the questionnaire contains 
questions not only on current labor force activities but also retrospectively.  We use the 
retrospective information to construct time series of employment and wages at each 
employer of each respondent.  This longitudinal tracking of firms and workers permits us 
to observe worker-firm matches before and after privatization, information we use to 
address potential biases arising from the selection of firms into ownership type and the 
selection of workers into employers of different types.  The sample of privatizations is 
larger than in most other studies, and the data also contain information on a comparison 
group of worker-firm matches remaining in state ownership throughout. 
The ULMS data contain detailed information on worker characteristics, which we 
exploit both to control for changing composition of employment at firms as they go 
through the privatization process and to assess the potentially differential impact of 
privatization on various types of workers.  Using interaction specifications, we estimate 
the influence of privatization on layoffs and wages by gender, schooling, experience, and 
firm size, among other variables.  The ULMS also clearly distinguishes new private from 
privatized firms, and we exclude the former from the analysis to focus on the effects of   5
privatization.  The data permit us to distinguish three types of controlling owners of 
privatized firms:  worker, manager, and outsider.  In some specifications, we exploit this 
information, disaggregating private ownership into these categories. 
The potential outcomes of privatization that we study with these data are layoffs 
and wages.  Our analysis of layoffs, which comprise all involuntary separations, includes 
information also on voluntary separations, which we classify by their declared motivation 
into “professional” and “personal” quits, defined below; this distinction is potentially 
important if some quits are disguised layoffs.  The separations analysis therefore relies on 
multinomial logit regressions, where the dependent variable is categorical:  staying with 
the same employer, layoff, quit for professional reasons, or quit for personal reasons.  
Using a sample of individuals who were employed at state firms in 1991, we estimate the 
effect of privatization on separation from that job in each subsequent year from 1992 to 
2002, controlling for other variables that may affect separations.  The wage variable we 
use from the ULMS is the contractual wage, which reduces measurement problems 
associated with wage arrears.  The wage equations are estimated for employees initially 
employed in the state sector, and they include standard controls from a Mincer earnings 
regression and, in some specifications, more detailed controls for occupation, tenure, 
computer use, marital status, region, industry, and firm size.  In addition to estimating by 
ordinary least squares (OLS), we also add worker fixed effects and worker-firm fixed 
effects in alternative specifications to control for selection bias.  In both cases, we interact 
privatization measures with worker and firm characteristics to investigate the effects of 
privatization effect on wage differentials.   6
  The results of the analysis imply that privatization cuts the layoff probability in 
half, but reduces wages by 5 percent.  Outside investor ownership reduces separations 
more than insider ownership, but leaves wages unaffected.  Winners from privatization 
tend to be higher-skilled employees of larger firms, but there is no discernible 
relationship with gender, education, or experience. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 describes the data 
and Section 3 explains our estimation methods.  Section 4 presents results, and 
conclusions are summarized in Section 5. 
2.  Data 
  The Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS) was carried out in 2003 
on a probability sample of households across Ukraine.  The response rate was 66 percent 
for households and 87 percent for individuals within those households, resulting in a 
sample of 4,005 households with 8,671 adult respondents (age 15–76 at the survey date).
5  
The survey contains standard questions on characteristics and current labor force 
participation.  For our purposes in this paper, however, a particularly useful feature of the 
ULMS is that it requested work history data from respondents.  In particular, the survey 
contains data on the main jobs held in December 1986 and December 1991 and on all 
main jobs between December 1997 and mid-2003.  Moreover, the survey contains 
detailed questions on the characteristics of each of those employers. 
The sample for the analysis of layoffs is determined as follows.  We restrict 
attention to main jobs held by respondents in December 1991, because nearly all 
                                                 
5 The ULMS was organized by Hartmut Lehmann and carried out by the Kyiv International Institute for Sociology, 
with financing from a consortium of institutions led by the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn.  We are 
grateful for all their efforts.  See Lehmann (2005) for more information on the survey.   7
privatization activity occurred after this date while a fair amount occurred before 
December 1997.
6  Since privatization had hardly started, workers’ selection of their 
December 1991 jobs was unlikely to have been influenced by the probability their 
employers would be privatized in the future.  Workers were asked if and when their 1991 
jobs ended, as well as the reasons for the separation if it occurred.  We follow these 1991 
jobs annually each December through the separation year or 2003, whichever comes 
first.
7  The analysis is carried out on workers who were between 16 and 62 years old in 
1991. 
  We also restrict the sample of 1991 jobs to those in state firms located on 
Ukrainian territory, and we exclude the budgetary sector (culture, education, health, the 
military, and public administration), since our interest is in firms that potentially could be 
privatized.  The ULMS asks workers about ownership changes occurring during their job 
tenure, not subsequently, so we cannot observe subsequent privatization and turnover for 
firms privatized after a worker separates from a state firm.  This implies that we are 
unable to control for anticipatory effects of firm selection:  if a firm is classifiable as 
“later privatized” in the data, that automatically means the worker did not separate from 
the firm prior to privatization.  To be in the sample in year t, the worker must have been 
employed in the December 1991 job in December of year t-1. 
As shown in Table 1, the basic regression sample for analyzing worker 
separations includes 22,203 worker-year observations with nonmissing data for all 
relevant variables, corresponding to 3,392 workers.  The sample includes 423 worker-
                                                 
6 Prior to 1993, the only legal process leading to privatization in Ukraine involved leasing and co-op arrangements 
inherited from the Soviet Union (Frydman et al., 1993).  For a time series on privatization in Ukrainian manufacturing, 
see Brown et al. (2006). 
7 The ULMS questionnaire does not contain information on jobs starting after December 1991 and ending before 
December 1997, so we cannot systematically follow workers to new jobs after they separate from their December 1991 
jobs.   8
firm matches in which privatization takes place during the workers’ tenure, with an 
average of 4.3 pre- and 4.8 post-privatization worker-firm observations for these workers.  
Because of missing values, the sample is diminished when we add more variables to the 
equation, as shown in Table 1. 
  Separations of workers from their employers are classified according to a detailed 
set of reasons given in the questionnaire, as shown in Table 2.  We distinguish different 
types of quits, because some types are more likely to represent disguised layoffs.   
Layoffs, in which we include all involuntary separations from the worker’s perspective, 
comprise separations due to shutdown, reorganization, bankruptcy, privatization, 
employment reduction, expiration of a contract, expiration of probation period, and other 
dismissals initiated by the employer.  We classify as “professional quits” those 
separations where the motivation was described as wanting a higher salary, better 
working conditions, more interesting work, or own business; and “personal quits” as 
those separations where the motivation was retirement (early or regular), end of own 
business, military conscription, imprisonment, own illness, return to school, marriage, 
parental leave, change of residence, or need to care for other family members.   
Respondents to the ULMS were permitted to provide multiple reasons, and we prioritize 
layoffs over professional quits, and professional over personal quits, except for expiration 
of contract or probation period, in which case the professional reasons are given priority 
over personal, and personal quits over layoffs.  According to the respondents, most of the 
dismissals are due to personnel reductions, plant closures, bankruptcies, and 
reorganizations, while very few are associated with privatization.    9
Table 3 provides mean separation rates for these constructed categories.  The total 
separation rate averages 11.5 percent per year, and it breaks down into a 3.9 percent 
dismissal rate, 3.0 percent professional quit rate, and 4.6 percent personal quit rate.   
Workers are in firms privatized in the year before or earlier in nearly 11 percent of the 
observations in the sample. 
  Turning to the wage regression sample, the ULMS contains the contractual wage 
data for the main job in each December of 1986, 1991, and from 1997 to 2002.  Our wage 
regression sample uses only the 1997–2002 observations, so that we have the same 
regular intervals for all respondents.  Observations are included on workers aged 15–72 
in full-time jobs at firms that were state-owned either in December 1997 or in the first 
observation of the job thereafter, and if the firm is not in the budgetary sector (again, 
because budgetary organizations are not subject to privatization).  Only full-time workers 
are included so as to reduce the problem of wage variation due to differences in hours 
worked.  Ideally we would like to control for hours worked, but unfortunately the ULMS 
does not contain hours data for full-time workers.  The variation in hours worked for full-
time employees is likely to be small, however, since worker hours in state and privatized 
firms are regulated by labor-protection laws.  Table 4 shows the sample construction and 
sample sizes by year for the various specifications of the wage equation. The sample 
contains 159 worker-firm matches where privatization takes place during the workers’ 
tenure, with an average of 3.2 pre- and 2.3 postprivatization worker-firm observations. 
The use of the contractual wage measure avoids the volatility problem associated 
with wage arrears, which has plagued much of the previous research of wage changes in 
former Soviet economies (as described by Earle and Sabirianova, 2002).  We deflate   10
wages by the Ukrainian State Statistics Committee’s December-to-December consumer 
price index.  Region and time dummies are included in most regressions to control for 
price variations not captured by this index.   
Summary statistics for all variables are shown in Table 3, and precise definitions 
for the variables are provided in the Appendix.  The ULMS questions on privatization 
and ownership are very detailed and carefully worded, and they elicit information on 
whether the firm was state-owned or privatized, and on which type of owner held the 
most shares both at the time the job began and when it ended (or as of the interview date), 
as well as the month and year in which ownership change occurred.  About 11 percent of 
observations in the separation sample pertain to privatized firms, and about 7 percent are 
privatized in the wage sample.  The sample of privatized observations falls when private 
ownership is disaggregated because workers are unsure which owner-type is dominant.  
Among those providing this information, however, most privatized firms in the sample 
are controlled by managers, with very few controlled by outsiders.
8  Nevertheless, the 
samples are large enough for us to be able to estimate the effects of these different types 
separately. 
To the extent that the ULMS is genuinely representative of the Ukrainian adult 
population, there is little reason to think that these samples are nonrepresentative of the 
relevant subpopulations.  In the separations analysis, the subpopulation is full-time 
employees of state-owned firms in December 1991.  In the wage analysis, the 
subpopulation is full-time employees of a state-owned firm either in December 1997 (if 
they were employed at that time) or in December of the years 1998–2002 (if they were 
                                                 
8 The sample sizes with foreign ownership are still much smaller, so we eschew analysis of this interesting dimension 
with these data.  For a firm-level study of employment and wage effects of privatization to foreign investors in Ukraine, 
see Brown et al. (2005).   11
not employed in December 1997).  In both cases, few observations are lost due to missing 
values, so there is little discrepancy between the original ULMS sample and our analysis 
sample for these subpopulations.  However, as an additional check, we compared our 
sample proportions by detailed region and by six industry-sectors with official statistics 
from the Ukrainian State Statistics Committee.  For the separation sample in 1995 
(roughly in the middle of our period), the correlations are 94.3 percent for regions and 
95.9 percent for sectors.  For the wage sample in 2000, the correlation is 84.4 percent for 
regions and 92.3 percent for sectors.  Thus, our regression samples are very similar to the 
official statistics, implying that they are indeed representative of the subpopulations we 
investigate. 
A natural concern with the data we are analyzing is the possibility of 
measurement error.  Two types are especially salient for our analysis.  The first is 
imperfect knowledge by workers of the ownership of their firms, which is a common 
problem in surveys of this type.  However, besides the careful wording of the ULMS 
questions, the nature of the Ukrainian privatization process was such that workers were 
frequently involved.  Concerning the distinction between state and private, fewer than 10 
percent of workers are unable to respond to the question, while an additional 10 percent 
or so are unable to identify which owner-type has the most shares. 
The second type of measurement error that deserves discussion is recall bias.  The 
separation regressions require workers to report accurately on their 1991 jobs including 
their reasons for separation, if they did separate.  The 1991 date was chosen for the 
ULMS questionnaire because it was that fall that Ukraine gained independence from the 
Soviet Union, and therefore workers would be more likely to remember what they were   12
doing around the time of those momentous events.  Moreover, very few workers (70, less 
than 2 percent of those employed at nonbudgetary state firms in 1991) are unable to 
provide information on separation from this job. 
Concerning potential recall bias in the wage regressions, the sample requirement 
in this case is that respondents remember wages for jobs held since December 1997, just 
over 5 years before their interviews.  Slightly more than 20 percent of the sample has a 
missing value for the wage.  If workers’ wage reports are accurate when they are reported 
and if nonreports are random, then there would be no recall bias.  If the reports are not 
accurate, then our standard errors are overstated.  If nonreports are nonrandom there 
could be an induced bias, although it is likely to be limited in magnitude because of the 
low level of nonreporting.  Moreover, there is only a slight difference in the incidence of 
privatization for workers reporting wages compared to those failing to report (6.6 percent 
of those with nonmissing wages are in privatized firms, compared with 5.3 percent of 
those with missing wages).  As a check on the plausibility of the data, we estimate 
standard Mincer earnings regressions and report the results below.  We also estimate 
using median (least absolute deviations) to reduce the influence of outliers.  Finally, our 
inclusion of worker fixed effects in some specifications would control for any fixed 
differences in wages and ownership across workers.  Our identification strategy of 
difference-in-differences removes all such time-invariant biases. 
3.  Estimation Framework 
The two outcome variables we investigate in this paper are job separations and 
wages.  As described in the previous section, the separation analysis uses a sample of 
workers who are employed at nonbudgetary state firms in December 1991 and investigate   13
whether or not a job separation takes place from these employers subsequently.   
Separations are then categorized according to the dominant reason, implying four 
categories for the dependent variable:  remained employed in the firm, layoff, 
professional quit, and personal quit.  We use multinomial logit models to estimate the 
probability of these events as a function of firm ownership and control variables.
9  In our 
analysis of the ULMS data, we find that Wald and Likelihood Ratio tests reject pooling 
any of these categories at the one percent level.  The Hausman test for independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) does not reject independence, while the Small-Hsiao test 
rejects it, which is a quite common result. 
The basic separations regression equation can be written as follows:  
 Pr(sit = j) = f(δjPrivateit-1 + Xitβj + αtj + uitj), (1) 
where Pr(sit = j) is the probability of separation type j by individual i in year t, f is the 
logistic function, Privateit-1 is an indicator of whether the employer was private in the 
previous year, δj is the coefficient to be estimated, Xit is a vector of controls and βj the 
associated vector of coefficients, the αtj are year effects, and uitj is the regression’s 
disturbance for alternative j.  Identification of δ in this model is based on the change in 
Privateit-1  for workers in firms becoming privatized compared to workers in firms 
remaining state-owned.
10 
                                                 
9 Though not reported here, we have also estimated multinomial probit models, which produce virtually identical 
results. 
10 Since the privatization information comes from respondents’ reports on whether and when their employers were 
privatized rather than from an independent source, we are unable to estimate a difference-in-differences model to better 
control for ownership selection bias.  Group effects for firms that are privatized during the period of observation are 
collinear with staying for the observations prior to the privatization year.  For the same reason, we are unable to 
estimate whether firms to be privatized in the following year engage in larger than usual personnel reductions.  The fact 
that almost no respondents who experienced a separation report that this was due to privatization suggests that firms did 
not engage in large personnel reductions near the time of privatization, however.  We are able to estimate regressions 
with Privateit (whether the employer was private in the current year); the results from these are very similar to those 
with the lagged variable. 
   14
We estimate several alternative versions of this model.  The year effects are 
included in all specifications to account for aggregate shocks that could affect separation 
probabilities, but the alternative versions differ in how the Xit and ownership variables are 
specified.  In a first, parsimonious specification, the Xit vector includes only years of 
experience, years of experience squared, years of education, and gender.  A second 
specification adds years of tenure, four occupational skill categories, computer use, 
marital status, four firm-size categories, six regional categories, and eight industry-sector 
dummies.  A third specification disaggregates Privateit-1 into types of new private 
owners, based on which type as the largest shareholding.  We refer to these types as 
worker-owned, manager-owned, and outside-owned.  Finally, we assess the possibly 
differential impact of privatization on various types of workers by including an 
interaction between ownership and worker characteristics: 
 Pr(sit = j) = f(δjPrivateit-1 + Xitβj + Privateit-1XitδXj + αtj + uitj) (2) 
where the coefficient vector δXj permits heterogeneity in the average effect δj with respect 
to characteristics Xit.  We consider each characteristic in turn, estimating separate 
equations with interactions for each. 
Turning to the effects of privatization on wages, we analyze workers who are 
employed at state-owned firms in the first observation of the worker-firm match in the 
regression sample.  Again, the basic empirical strategy is to compare wage changes of 
workers whose firms are privatized with those that are not, adjusting for individual 
characteristics.  In this case, however, we can also control for a variety of types of 
correlated effects.  The basic earnings equation can be written as follows: 
 ln(wit) = δPrivateit-1 + γEverPrivatei + Xitβ + ρi + αt + uit,  (3)   15
where  EverPrivatei indicates whether the employer is ever privatized (during our 
observation period) and γ is the associated coefficient.  The ρi are region effects, defined 
over the 26 Ukrainian oblasts plus Kiev, to permit geographic variation in average wages 
and costs of living.  We start with a simple difference-in-difference estimator that sets Xit 
≡ 0.  Next, as a check on the data, we estimate a basic Mincer earnings regression, where 
Privateit-1 and EverPrivatei are excluded and the Xit  vector includes only years of 
experience, years of experience squared, years of education, and gender.  Then we 
combine these two specifications into a regression-adjusted difference-in-difference 
estimator, where the controls are those from the Mincer specification. 
  The difference-in-difference estimator could still be subject to selection bias, for 
instance, if workers have some unobservable skill that is correlated with their propensity 
to work in privatized companies.  In other specifications, therefore, we include worker 
fixed effects.  Concern that worker-firm matches may also reflect specific match quality 
correlated with ownership leads us to include worker-firm fixed effects.  We investigate 
the within-worker-firm-matches specification controlling also for sector-year and region-
year interactions, in separate specifications. 
  Analogously to our approach with the separations regressions, we estimate 
versions of Equation (3) in which ownership is disaggregated into managerial, worker, 
and outsider types.  We also add a larger set of control variables, and we investigate 
whether the estimated privatization effects are heterogeneous for the observable 
characteristics represented by those variables.   16
4.  Results 
  Figure 1 plots the unconditional mean layoff and professional quit rates using the 
December 1991 job sample for state and privatized firms separately.  Layoff rates in state 
firms display a strong upward trend throughout the period, reaching over 9 percent in 
2002.  Except in 1998, the state layoff rates are always higher than in privatized firms, 
where they are usually about 3 percent.  The professional quit rate is always higher in 
state firms also, although the difference is much less striking than for layoffs.  Though 
not displayed, the personal quit rates are higher in state firms in every year except 1995.  
These numbers imply that separations tend to be lower after privatization, but of course 
they do not control for worker characteristics that could be correlated with both 
ownership and turnover behavior. 
  For the purpose of taking such controls into account, we report multinomial logit 
regressions for separation from the December 1991 job, as in Equation (1).  The basic 
multinomial logit marginal effect results, including controls for experience, education, 
gender, and time effects, are displayed in Table 5.  Consistent with the differences-of-
means analysis in Figure 1, privatization is negatively and statistically significantly 
associated with all three types of separations.  Given that the unconditional mean for 
layoffs is 0.039, the marginal privatization effect of -0.019 implies that layoffs are cut 
approximately in half.  Privatization also approximately halves the professional quit rate 
and lowers the personal quit rate by a third.  Experience is unrelated to dismissals, but is 
negatively related to professional quits.  At low levels of experience, the impact on 
personal quits is also negative, but the shape is strongly concave, becoming strongly 
positive at higher levels, presumably with retirement.  More highly educated workers are   17
estimated to face higher dismissal rates, but the marginal effect is statistically 
insignificant at conventional levels.  Females have a higher probability of job loss and of 
quitting for personal reasons, but males engage more often in professional quits. 
  The specification in Table 6 includes additional worker and firm characteristics, 
as well as regional and sector dummies.  Their inclusion has little effect on the 
privatization coefficients, which are still negative and significant.  Tenure has a strong 
negative association with dismissals and professional quits.  Skilled blue-collar workers 
and technicians are more likely to be dismissed than unskilled workers, and single 
persons are more likely to be laid off.  Surprisingly, both quit rates are higher in larger 
firms.   
  We next distinguish between privatizations resulting in worker, manager, and 
outsider control.  Table 7 shows that all three ownership types have negative effects on 
all types of separations.  We can reject the hypothesis that workers are better able to 
protect themselves from dismissals if they control the firm post-privatization than if 
outsiders control it, as the outsider ownership coefficient is even more negative than the 
worker ownership coefficient.  The managerial ownership coefficient is statistically 
significantly less negative than worker and outside ownership for professional quits and 
is significantly less negative than worker ownership for personal quits.  These results 
diverge somewhat from Brown and Earle’s (2003) from Russia.  They find that outside 
blockholders are associated with less worker churning, similar to the findings here, but 
they also find that managerial ownership is associated with increased worker churning. 
  To see whether privatization creates winners and losers in firms, in the sense that 
it influences the relative propensity of different types of workers to be separated, we   18
interact privatization with each of the worker characteristics, along with firm size.  We do 
not interact privatization with all the variables at the same time, but rather estimate 
separate regressions for each of the characteristics or groups of characteristics where 
interactions are included, because of the limited number of privatizations in the sample.  
The specifications are otherwise identical to that in Table 6.  As displayed in Table 8, we 
find that privatized firms lay off women with a similar propensity to state-owned firms.  
Privatization has an insignificant influence on the human capital coefficients, with the 
exception of skills.  It lowers the dismissal and quit rates of professional employees, the 
quit rates of skilled blue collar workers and technicians, and the dismissal rate of workers 
who have used computers.  No relationship is found with firm size.  Finally, we interact 
privatization with the residual from a 1991 wage regression, so as to test whether 
privatized owners would have a greater propensity to lay off workers who had enjoyed 
rents during the Soviet period.  No such evidence is found here. 
  Next we turn to the wage results.  Figure 2 shows that mean real wage levels in 
state and privatized firms fell at similar rates through the year 2000, but state wages 
rebounded more strongly and a year earlier than those in privatized firms as the economy 
recovered from the aftershocks of Russia’s 1998 fiscal crisis.   
In a difference-in-difference specification controlling only for region and year 
effects (specification 1 in Table 9), privatization has an insignificant effect on the wage 
level.  The insignificance of the ever private coefficient suggests no systematic difference 
in wage levels between to-be-privatized firms and always state-owned firms.  We explore 
the plausibility of the data with a Mincerian wage regression in specification 2.  The 
coefficients are highly significant and are of similar magnitudes to those found in other   19
transition economies.
11  Specification 3 combines the variables from the first two 
specifications, and again the privatization coefficient is insignificant. Worker fixed 
effects are included in specification 4, which results in a lower and statistically significant 
privatization coefficient.
12  The inclusion of worker-firm fixed effects (specification 5) 
makes the coefficient slightly less negative, and it is significant only at the 10 percent 
level.  As a robustness check, we add sector-year effects (specification 6) and region-year 
effects (specification 7), since wages could change differently across time by sector 
and/or region.  Once again, the privatization coefficient is negative, though not 
significant when including sector-year effects.  The fixed effects specifications suggest 
that privatization lowers wages by about 5 percent.  This contrasts with Brown et al. 
(2005), who find no such privatization-induced wage reduction in Ukraine.    
  Table 10 shows the estimated effects of the disaggregated ownership variables on 
wages.  The specifications are analogous to specifications 1 and 4–7 in Table 9.  None of 
the ownership categories shows systematic differences from always state firms prior to 
privatization in the difference-in-difference specification.  In the fixed effects 
specifications, worker and manager ownership have negative and usually significant 
effects, and outside ownership has a small positive, but statistically insignificant effect on 
wages.  The worker effect ranges from -28 to -31 percent, and the manager effect is -5 to 
-7 percent, and the difference in their coefficients is statistically significant at the 10 
percent level.  The worker and outsider coefficients are statistically significant different 
from one another at the 5 percent level.  These results in conjunction with the separations 
disaggregated ownership results suggest that workers clearly do better under outsider 
                                                 
11 See, for example, Münich et al. (2005).  
12 We have also tried specifications including random effects, but they fail the Hausman test at the 1 percent level.   20
than insider ownership, particularly worker ownership.  Aghion and Blanchard’s (1998) 
trade-off between efficiency and worker welfare appears not to exist. 
  We next explore whether privatization affects wage differentials.  To see the main 
effects of each variable of interest, we include additional worker and firm characteristics 
to a difference-in-difference specification in the first column of Table 11.  There is a 
positive return to skills, but none to tenure.  Married workers and those in larger firms 
enjoy a premium.  In the second and third columns we report cross-section regressions in 
1997 and 2002, so as to see differences in returns across time.  The coefficient on tenure 
has become positive, while that on education has fallen by two-thirds.  The gender wage 
gap has been reduced by over four percentage points and the marriage premium has 
increased by one point.  Returns to skills have increased considerably, as has the wage 
premium for working in larger firms.  The statistically significant changes are technician 
(10 percent level), small firm (10 percent level), medium firm (1 percent level), and large 
firm (5 percent level).    
  Has privatization played a role in any of these wage differential changes?  To test 
this, we interact each of the characteristics with privatization, done analogously to what 
was done in the separations analysis above.
13  Table 12 shows that privatization has had 
an insignificant effect on the changes in returns to education and the gender wage gap, 
while it has played an important role in increasing the returns to professionals and 
computer users and raising the large-firm wage premium.  In contrast, privatization has 
significantly attenuated the increase in the marriage premium. 
                                                 
13 It would be interesting to run interactions with disaggregated ownership, but unfortunately the data contain too few 
worker and outsider privatizations to produce reliable estimates.   21
5.   Conclusion 
  Workers frequently express strong concerns about how privatization may affect 
their job security and wages, and their pessimistic expectations seem to be widely shared 
by many observers who believe that layoffs and wage cuts are a cost of increased 
productive efficiency.  But whether privatization actually produces these consequences 
for workers has been the subject of relatively little systematic analysis.  Some previous 
studies in this area have used firm-level data, where selection of firms into ownership 
type could be controlled for, but worker characteristics, composition, turnover, and self-
selection could not.  Other studies have used a cross-sectional approach with worker-
level data, where neither type of selection process can be handled and the ownership and 
wage variables are sometimes poorly measured. 
In this paper, we control for both worker and firm selection, as worker-firm 
matches are followed before and after privatization.  Motivated by the questions in this 
paper, the instrument used to collect the ULMS data was designed to contain better 
ownership questions than past surveys, allowing us to make clearer distinctions between 
state-owned, privatized, and new private firms, as well as to analyze the effects of 
worker-, manager-, and outsider-controlled firms separately.  The survey paid careful 
attention to the measurement of wages to avoid the extreme volatility created by wage 
arrears.  The survey sample was carefully selected and it appears to be genuinely 
representative.  However, a disadvantage of the survey data is the small sample size.  In 
particular, the small number of privatizations resulting in worker and outsider control 
makes it difficult to draw strong conclusions about the differences in their effects relative 
to managerial control, where there are many observations.  A second possible   22
disadvantage is the retrospective nature of the data, which is necessary for our 
longitudinal estimation methods but which may produce recall errors. 
  Bearing potential problems in mind, we have constructed our empirical methods 
to exploit the structure of the data and maximize the possibilities for identifying the 
effects of privatization.  In our analysis of worker separations, we focus on jobs held by 
workers in 1991, well before privatization really started, and we follow these jobs until a 
separation occurs or 2002, whichever comes first.  The data permit us to distinguish three 
principal categories of separations, layoffs and professional and personal quits, and they 
contain a rich set of control variables for the analysis.  Some firms are privatized and 
others remain state-owned, so that identification is based on the comparison of not only 
before and after privatization but also relative to the always state-owned comparison 
group.  In our analysis of wage effects, we examine a panel of workers initially in state-
owned employers with annual observations from 1997 to 2002.  We follow these 
workers’ wages even if they move across employers, as long as the new employer is 
state-owned.  This procedure allows us to control not only for detailed worker 
characteristics but also for worker fixed effects, and in alternative specifications for 
worker-firm match fixed effects.  The latter estimator is identified by changes in 
ownership during worker-firm matches, using all employment spells when there are no 
changes as the comparison group. 
The results of the separations analysis suggest that privatization reduces worker 
separations of all types, halving the dismissal and professional quit rates.  Wage levels 
are also reduced by about 5 percent, however.  Workers in worker-controlled firms have 
suffered large wage losses, while those in outsider-controlled firms may have enjoyed   23
wage gains.  A possible explanation for this pattern could be that worker-controlled firms 
have not seen substantial efficiency gains, necessitating labor cost cuts.  Workers have 
chosen to accept lower wages in exchange for continued employment.  In contrast, 
workers in outsider-controlled firms need not make such an unpleasant trade, as the firms 
may have expanded their scales, making cuts in labor costs unnecessary. 
  The biggest winners from privatization appear to be high-skilled workers in large 
firms.  Private owners may have invested more in new technologies, leading to increased 
demand for skilled workers.  This is particularly likely to be true in large firms, which 
tend to be more capital-intensive and have more capital-skill complementarity. 
  Workers have frequently opposed privatization, particularly to outside investors.  
However, the evidence in this paper implies that Ukrainian workers suffered little if at all 
from privatization, at least in terms of job security and wages.  Those in outsider-
privatized firms appear to have gained.  Of course, workers’ fears of privatization could 
relate to considerations other than employment and wages, but this is a question for 
future research.  
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Appendix:  Variable Definitions 
Computer is equal to 1 if the person has used a computer (on the job or elsewhere) prior 
to year t.  
Education is the adjusted years of schooling in year t.  We impute the modal value of 
years of schooling by five-year age cohort for each level of completed education.   
Ever private is equal to 1 if the firm is privatized during the observation period of the 
regression sample. 
Experience is the number of years, as of year t, since the respondent started the first job. 
Female is equal to 1 if the person is female. 
Large firm is equal to 1 if the employer has 1,000 or more employees, as reported by the 
worker. 
Manager-owned is equal to 1 if the employer was privatized in year t-1 or before and the 
largest proportion of shares were owned by managers of the firm after the ownership 
change. 
Married is equal to 1 if the worker is married in year t. 
Medium firm is equal to 1 if the employer has 250-999 employees, as reported by the 
worker. 
Micro firm is equal to 1 if the employer has 19 or fewer employees, as reported by the 
worker.  This is the omitted firm size category in the regressions. 
Outsider-owned is equal to 1 if the employer was privatized in year t-1 or before and the 
largest proportion of shares were owned by outside domestic shareholders or foreign 
investors after the ownership change.  We combine these two groups, because there are 
so few firms where foreign investors hold the largest proportion of shares. 
Privatized is equal to 1 if the worker reports an ownership change in the employer from 
state firm (defined as a budgetary organization, state enterprise, or a local municipal 
enterprise) to privatized firm while the worker was employed at the firm, the majority of 
shares were owned by private entities after the change, and the change occurred in year t-
1 or before. 
Professional is equal to 1 if the worker’s occupation is in the one-digit ISCO categories 
of legislators, senior officials, and managers (1) or professionals (2). 
Separations are divided into four categories: dismissals (closing down of the enterprise, 
reorganization of the enterprise, bankruptcy of the enterprise, privatization of the 
enterprise, dismissal initiated by employer, personnel reduction, expiring of the 
employment contract, and expiring of probation time), professional quits (wanted/was 
proposed higher salary, wanted/was proposed better working conditions, wanted/was 
proposed more interesting work, wanted to start own business, main job became second 
job, and end of farming/sole proprietorship), and personal quits (military service, 
imprisonment, own illness or injury, studies, retirement, early retirement, marriage, 
parental leave, need to take care of other members of family, change of residence).  If 
workers provide multiple reasons for the separation, we prioritize dismissal reasons over 
professional reasons over personal reasons, except for expiring of employment contract 
or probation time, in which case we prioritize professional and then personal reasons over 
dismissal reasons.  The reason for dividing quits into ones for professional reasons and   27
ones for personal reasons is that the former are more likely to be disguised layoffs.  The 
separations variable is measured as of the end of year t for the December 1991 job.  It is 
set to missing if the person did not hold the job in December of year t-1. 
Small firm is equal to 1 if the employer has 20–249 or more employees, as reported by 
the worker. 
Skilled blue-collar is equal to 1 if the worker’s occupation is in the one-digit ISCO 
categories of clerk (4), service workers and shop and market sales workers (5), skilled 
agricultural and fishery workers (6), craft and related workers (7), or plant and machine 
operators and assemblers (8).  
Technician is equal to 1 if the worker’s occupation is in the one-digit ISCO categories of 
technicians and associate professionals (3). 
Tenure is the number of years since the job start year as of year t. 
Unskilled is equal to 1 if the worker’s occupation is in the one-digit ISCO categories of 
elementary occupations (9).  This is the omitted skill category in the regressions. 
Wage is the monthly contractual wage after taxes at the primary job in December of year 
t.  It is converted to December 2002 hryvnyas, using the Ukrainian State Statistics 
Committee December-to-December national consumer price indices. Regional deflators 
are not available prior to 2001. 
Worker-owned is equal to 1 if the employer was privatized in year t-1 or before and the 
largest proportion of shares were owned by the firm’s non-managerial workers after the 
ownership change. 
1991 Rents is the residual from a 1991 wage regression including experience, experience 
squared, education, female, tenure, skill dummies, married, firm size dummies, economic 
sector dummies, and six regional dummies.    28
Table 1:  Sample Construction forSeparation Regression 
 
  Individuals  Individual-
years 
Total ULMS sample  8,641   
Employed in December 1991  5,207   
December 1991 employer was state, budgetary, municipal 
firm, or collective farm  5,008  
December 1991 employer not in budgetary sector   3,747   
Non-missing dependent variable (separation category):  3,677  24,553 
•  No separation  875 21,751 
•  Dismissed  915 915 
•  Professional quit  706 706 
•  Personal quit  1,181 1,181 
Non-missing dependent and independent variables:     
•  Basic regression (Table 5) sample  3,392 22,203 
•  Additional control variables (Table 6) sample  2,791 18,709 
•  Disaggregated ownership (Table 7) sample  2,791 18,006 
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Table 2:  Reasons for Separations 
 
Reason Number  Percent 
Layoffs    
   Closing down of enterprise  210  7.5 
   Reorganization of enterprise  199  7.1 
   Bankruptcy of enterprise  126  4.5 
   Privatization of enterprise  15  0.5 
   Dismissal initiated by employer  76  2.7 
   Personnel reduction  342  12.2 
   Expiring of employment contract  12  0.4 
   Expiring of probation time  1  0.0 
   Total layoffs  915  32.7 
Professional quits     
   Wanted/was proposed higher salary  333  11.9 
   Wanted/was proposed better working conditions  196  7.0 
   Wanted/was proposed more interesting work  67  2.4 
   Wanted to start own business  27  1.0 
   Total professional quits  706  25.2 
Personal Quits     
   Military service  9  0.3 
   Imprisonment  4  0.1 
   Own illness or injury  189  6.7 
   Studies  4  0.1 
   Retirement  847  30.2 
   Early retirement  67  2.4 
   Marriage  22  0.8 
   Parental leave  71  2.5 
   Need to take care of other family members  102  3.6 
   Change of residence  69  2.5 
   Main job became second job  1  0.0 
   End of farming/sole proprietorship  0  0.0 
   Total personal quits  1,181  42.1 
Note:  The sum of answers exceeds the number of separations because respondents were permitted to give 
multiple reasons.  In addition to the responses show, two respondents said the reason was difficult to say, and 
none refused to answer.   30
Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Separation sample  Wage sample 
Layoffs 0.039   
Professional Quits   0.030   
Personal Quits  0.046   
Real Wage (December 1992 hrynyas)  311.083 (194.126) 
Privatized  0.108   0.068  
Worker-owned  0.012   0.004  
Manager-owned  0.054   0.035  
Outsider-owned 0.007    0.005 
Experience (years)  25.126 (10.723)  23.046 (11.787) 
Education (years)  10.250 (1.706)  10.392 (1.634) 
Female 0.481    0.421 
Tenure (years)  17.065 (10.197)  12.623 (10.926) 
Unskilled 0.131    0.116 
Skilled blue-collar  0.597   0.634 
Technician  0.064   0.078  
Professional  0.208   0.172  
Computer  0.052   0.116  
Married  0.852   0.831  
Micro firm  0.090   0.118  
Small firm  0.356   0.379  
Medium firm  0.240   0.191  
Large firm  0.315   0.312  
Note: The sample mean is shown for each variable (standard deviation in parentheses for 
continuous variables).  The separation sample is from Table 6 and the wage sample is from 
Table 11.  The disaggregated ownership variables are based on the same samples, minus 
individual-years where disaggregated ownership is missing.  Variable definitions are in the 
Appendix.   31
Table 4: Sample Construction for Wage Regression 
 
 Workers  Worker-Firm 
Matches  Worker-years
Total sample (employed)   5,512  7,083  25,106 
Full-time employee  5,245  6,669  23,487 
Employer initially state-owned  3,379  3,797  14,185 
Not in budgetary sector  1,901  2,051  7,457 
Non-missing wage  1,560  1,666  5,493 
Non-zero wage:  1,555  1,660  5,461 
Non-missing independent variables:   
•  Basic regression sample 
(Table 9, specification 1)  
1,555 1,660 5,461 
•  Disaggregated ownership sample 
(Table 10, Specification 1) 
1,549 1,653 5,334 
•  Additional control variables sample 
(Table 11)  
1,273 1,350    4,482 
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Private Dismissed State Dismissed Private Professional Quits State Professional Quits
 
Note: These are annual dismissal and professional quit rates from the December 1991 job, as of December of each 
subsequent year. 
   33
Table 5:  Effect of Privatization on Separations 
 
  Dismissal  Professional Quit  Personal Quit 
Privatized -0.019***  -0.014***  -0.016*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Experience/100 -0.022  -0.128***  -0.313*** 
  (0.051) (0.037)  (0.059) 
(Experience/100)
2  -0.038 0.051  0.965*** 
  (0.101) (0.077)  (0.112) 
Education/100 0.118  -0.012  -0.360*** 
  (0.074) (0.068)  (0.078) 
Female 0.009***  -0.013***  0.025*** 
  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) 
Note:  The marginal effect is shown for each variable, with the standard error (corrected for firm clustering) in 
parentheses.  Year dummies are also included.  N=22,203.  Pseudo R
2 = 0.058.  *** = significant at 1% level.   34
Table 6:  Effect of Privatization on Separations with Full Controls 
 
  Dismissal  Professional quit  Personal quit 
Privatized -0.019***  -0.010***  -0.012*** 
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) 
Experience/100 0.069  -0.053  -0.331*** 
  (0.056) (0.039)  (0.057) 
(Experience/100)
2  -0.136 0.004  0.973*** 
  (0.109) (0.080)  (0.105) 
Education/100 0.025  0.013  -0.170** 
  (0.091) (0.081)  (0.086) 
Female 0.005*  -0.013***  0.027*** 
  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) 
Tenure/100 -0.047***  -0.089***  0.007 
  (0.017) (0.015)  (0.014) 
Skilled blue-collar  0.008*  -0.001  0.009*** 
  (0.004) (0.003)  (0.003) 
Technician 0.025***  -0.001  -0.013** 
  (0.009) (0.005)  (0.005) 
Professional 0.008  -0.004 -0.000 
  (0.006) (0.004)  (0.005) 
Computer use  -0.007  0.001  -0.006 
  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.006) 
Married -0.007**  -0.002  -0.004 
  (0.004) (0.003)  (0.003) 
Small firm  -0.002  0.002  0.004 
  (0.005) (0.004)  (0.005) 
Medium firm  0.003  0.010*  0.015*** 
  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.006) 
Large firm  -0.001  0.012**  0.010* 
  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.006) 
Note:  The marginal effect is shown for each variable, with the standard error (corrected for firm clustering) in 
parentheses.  Region, sector, and year dummies are also included. N=18,709.  Pseudo R
2  = 0.072.  * = 
significant at 10% level. ** = significant at 5% level. *** = significant at 1% level. 
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Table 7:  Effects of Ownership Types on Separations  
 
  Dismissal  Professional quit  Personal quit 
Worker-owned -0.022***  -0.020***  -0.022*** 
  (0.006) (0.001)  (0.005) 
Manager-owned -0.019***  -0.007***  -0.008* 
  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.005) 
Outsider-owned -0.030***  -0.017***  -0.023** 
  (0.005) (0.001)  (0.010) 
Note:  The marginal effect is shown for each variable, with the standard error (corrected for firm clustering) in 
parentheses.  All non-ownership variables from Table 6 are also included.  N=18,006.  * = significant at 10% level. ** = 
significant at 5% level. *** = significant at 1% level.   36
Table 8:  Separation Interactions Regressions 
 
  Dismissal  Professional quit  Personal quit 
Privatized -0.032***  -0.027***  -0.027 
  (0.012) (0.008)  (0.018) 
Experience/100 0.052  -0.060  -0.348*** 
  (0.058) (0.039)  (0.060) 
(Experience/100)
2  -0.097 0.019  1.005*** 
  (0.113) (0.081)  (0.112) 
Privatized*Experience/100 0.269  0.289  0.212 
  (0.268) (0.244)  (0.291) 
Privatized*(Experience/100)
2 -0.549  -0.504  -0.344 
  (0.475) (0.468)  (0.429) 
Privatized -0.016  -0.002  -0.002 
  (0.017) (0.027)  (0.023) 
Education/100 0.028  0.020  -0.016* 
  (0.095) (0.082)  (0.090) 
Privatized*Education/100 -0.039  -0.102  -0.113 
  (0.247) (0.271)  (0.224) 
Privatized -0.023***  -0.008**  -0.017*** 
  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.005) 
Female 0.004  -0.012***  0.026*** 
  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) 
Privatized*Female 0.016  -0.007  0.014 
  (0.014) (0.007)  (0.014) 
Privatized -0.016***  -0.018***  -0.005 
  (0.007) (0.005)  (0.009) 
Tenure/100 -0.045***  -0.094***  0.010 
  (0.017) (0.015)  (0.014) 
Privatized*Tenure/100 -0.022  0.072 -0.035 
  (0.048) (0.045)  (0.042) 
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  Dismissal  Professional quit  Personal quit 
Privatized -0.014**  0.001  0.008 
  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.009) 
Skilled blue-collar  0.009**  0.001  0.012*** 
  (0.004) (0.003)  (0.004) 
Privatized*skilled blue-collar -0.010  -0.010***  -0.020*** 
  (0.007) (0.004)  (0.004) 
Technician 0.025***  0.002  -0.009 
  (0.010) (0.005)  (0.006) 
Privatized*technician -0.010  -0.025***  -0.024*** 
  (0.013) (0.001)  (0.009) 
Professional 0.012*  -0.000  0.002 
  (0.007) (0.004)  (0.005) 
Privatized*professional -0.013*  -0.010**  -0.014** 
  (0.008) (0.004)  (0.006) 
Privatized -0.018***  -0.009***  -0.012*** 
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.004) 
Computer -0.004  0.003  -0.006 
  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) 
Privatized*computer -0.020**  -0.013  0.001 
  (0.009) (0.008)  (0.020) 
Privatized -0.019***  -0.010  0.008 
  (0.006) (0.007)  (0.009) 
Married -0.007**  -0.002  -0.001 
  (0.004) (0.003)  (0.003) 
Privatized*married 0.000  -0.001  -0.020*** 
  (0.012) (0.011)  (0.005) 
 
 
   38
 
  Dismissal  Professional quit  Personal quit 
Privatized -0.025***  -0.012  -0.009 
  (0.009) (0.012)  (0.016) 
Small firm  -0.002  0.003  0.004 
  (0.005) (0.004)  (0.005) 
Medium firm  0.003  0.009*  0.016*** 
  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.006) 
Large firm  -0.002  0.012**  0.011* 
  (0.005) (0.006)  (0.006) 
Privatized*Small firm  0.013  -0.005  -0.002 
  (0.030) (0.017)  (0.021) 
Privatized*Medium firm  0.009  0.007  -0.007 
  (0.028) (0.026)  (0.018) 
Privatized*Large Firm  0.025  0.005  -0.001 
  (0.036) (0.024)  (0.022) 
Privatized -0.021***  -0.005  -0.014*** 
  (0.003) (0.004)  (0.004) 
1991 rents  0.003  -0.004  0.008** 
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) 
Privatized*1991 rents  -0.011  -0.014  -0.015 
  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.015) 
Note:  The bold lines separate different regressions.  The marginal effect is shown for each variable, with the standard 
error (corrected for firm clustering) in parentheses.  All variables from Table 6 are also included in each regression.  * = 
significant at 10% level. ** = significant at 5% level. *** = significant at 1% level. 
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Note: These are mean monthly wages in constant December 2002 UAH. Only privatizations occurring between 1998 
and 2002 are included here.   40
Table 9:  Wage Regressions  
 
  Spec. 1  Spec. 2  Spec. 3  Spec. 4  Spec. 5  Spec. 6  Spec. 7 
Privatized -0.011    -0.002  -0.061**  -0.051*  -0.033  -0.051* 
  (0.044)   (0.043)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.029) 
Ever  private  0.009    0.017  0.256**     
  (0.045)   (0.044)  (0.135)       
Experience    0.019***  0.019***      
   (0.004)  (0.004)      
Experience
2/1,000    -0.422***  -0.420***      
   (0.080) (0.079)      
Education    0.058***  0.058***      
   (0.008) (0.008)      
Female    -0.355***  -0.355***      
   (0.028) (0.028)      
Controls  R, Y  R, Y  R, Y  Y  Y  S-Y  R-Y 
Fixed effects        Worker  Worker-firm  Worker-firm  Worker-firm 
R
2  0.124  0.237 0.237  0.232  0.258 0.268 0.289 
N  5,461  5,424 5,424  5,461 5,461 5,418 5,461 
Note:  R = region dummies, Y = year dummies, R-Y = region-year dummies, and S-Y = sector-year dummies.  The R
2 in the fixed effects specifications 
are R
2 within.  Standard errors (corrected for firm clustering) are shown in parentheses.  * = significant at 10% level. ** = significant at 5% level. *** = 
significant at 1% level.   41
Table 10:  Wage Regressions with Disaggregated Ownership 
 
  Spec. 1  Spec. 2  Spec. 3  Spec. 4  Spec. 5 
Worker-owned -0.133 -0.314***  -0.303*** -0.274**  -0.298***
  (0.167) (0.118)  (0.118)  (0.113)  (0.120) 
Ever worker  -0.126  -0.138***       
  (0.146) (0.013)     
Manager-owned -0.027  -0.080**  -0.072** -0.048  -0.072**
  (0.061) (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.037) 
Ever manager  0.015  0.410***       
  (0.060) (0.132)     
Outsider-owned 0.245  0.013  0.022  0.037  0.014 
  (0.185) (0.094)  (0.094)  (0.098)  (0.095) 
Ever  outsider  0.091      
  (0.244)      
Controls  R, Y  Y  Y  S-Y  R-Y 
Fixed effects    Worker  Worker-Firm Worker-Firm  Worker-Firm
R
2 0.127  0.238  0.265  0.272  0.298 
N  5,334 5,334  5,334  5,291  5,334 
Note:  R = region dummies, Y = year dummies, R-Y = region-year dummies, and S-Y = sector-year dummies.  The R
2 
in the fixed effects specifications are R
2 within.  Specification 1 also includes experience, experience sq., education, 
and female.  Standard errors (corrected for firm clustering) are shown in parentheses.  * = significant at 10% level. 
** = significant at 5% level. *** = significant at 1% level.   42
Table 11:  Wage Regression with Full Controls 
 
  Pooled 1997 2002 
Privatized -0.025     
  (0.043)    
Ever  private 0.030    
  (0.045)    
Experience  0.017*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Experience
2/1,000  -0.416*** -0.432*** -0.611*** 
  (0.085) (0.114) (0.117) 
Education  0.025*** 0.036*** 0.011 
  (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) 
Female  -0.325*** -0.348*** -0.305*** 
  (0.031) (0.040) (0.042) 
Tenure  0.002 0.000 0.004* 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Skilled blue-collar  0.166***  0.147**  0.194*** 
  (0.048) (0.066) (0.064) 
Technician 0.212***  0.180**  0.341*** 
  (0.063) (0.085) (0.078) 
Professional  0.299*** 0.238*** 0.430*** 
  (0.063) (0.083) (0.086) 
Computer use  0.136***  0.028  0.142*** 
  (0.042) (0.094) (0.053) 
Married 0.070*  0.075  0.086* 
  (0.038) (0.052) (0.052) 
Small firm  0.154***  0.038  0.171*** 
  (0.047) (0.062) (0.063) 
Medium firm  0.183***  0.053  0.299*** 
  (0.057) (0.073) (0.073) 
Large firm  0.261***  0.151**  0.352*** 
  (0.060) (0.075) (0.076) 
R
2  0.346 0.314 0.420 
N  4,482 868 718 
Note:  Sector, region, and year dummies are also included.  Standard errors (corrected for firm 
clustering) are shown in parentheses.  * = significant at 10% level. ** = significant at 5% level. 
*** = significant at 1% level.   43
Table 12:  Wage Interactions Regressions 
 
Privatized 0.070    Privatized  -0.063** 
  (0.108)     (0.029) 
Privatized*Experience -0.010    Computer  0.186*** 
  (0.010)     (0.040) 
Privatized* Experience
2/1,000 0.181    Privatized*Computer  0.182*** 
  (0.189)     (0.068) 
Privatized 0.059    Ever  private*Computer  -0.217*** 
  (0.170)     (0.078) 
Privatized*Education -0.011    Privatized  -0.139** 
  (0.016)     (0.062) 
Privatized -0.045    Privatized*Small  firm  0.023 
  (0.033)     (0.085) 
Privatized*Female -0.012    Privatized*Medium  firm  0.085 
  (0.056)     (0.074) 
Privatized -0.039    Privatized*Large  firm  0.170** 
  (0.043)     (0.074) 
Privatized*Tenure -0.001  Privatized  0.069 
  (0.002)     (0.060) 
Privatized -0.081    Married  -0.009 
  (0.055)     (0.076) 
Privatized*Skilled blue-collar  -0.012   Privatized*Married  -0.146** 
  (0.066)     (0.066) 
Privatized*Technician 0.017    Ever  private*Married  -0.080 
  (0.116)   (0.158) 
Privatized*Professional 0.128*     
  (0.076)    
Note:  The bold lines separate different regressions.  Year dummies and worker-firm fixed effects are also included.  
Standard errors (corrected for firm clustering) are shown in parentheses.  * = significant at 10% level. ** = significant at 
5% level. *** = significant at 1% level. 
 